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THE NEED TO RETREAT FROM INFLEXIBLE
CONVERSION RULES-AN EQUITABLE
APPROACH TO JUDGMENT IN FOREIGN
CURRENCY
I. INTRODUCTION
Finding the proper method for converting foreign money
judgments into domestic currency when the relative value of
the domestic currency and the foreign currency fluctuates has
perplexed Anglo-American courts and legal scholars for de-
cades.1 In Anglo-American Law, traditional doctrine has been
that courts cannot render judgment in a foreign currency.' As
a result, when judgment is awarded for a contractual obliga-
tion on a debt that is expressed in terms of foreign currency,
the court must convert the amount owed into an equivalent
amount in domestic currency. This would be simple if it were
not for the fact that foreign monies fluctuate relative to one
another. At one point the dollar may equal five German
marks, but two months later it may be worth only three
marks. Difficulties arise regarding the applicable rule for de-
termining conversions. For example, assume that X con-
tracted to build a bridge for Y in France and X breaches this
contract. Y sues X in the United States for payment due of
one hundred francs. The court, however, can only enter judg-
ment in American dollars. On the day of breach, one hundred
© 1982 by Paul L. Lion III
1. See Cohn, Conversion of Foreign Money Obligations Maturing During War,
50 GEO. L.J. 513 (1962); Dach, Conversion of Foreign Money, 3 AM. J. CoMP. L. 155
(1954); Drake, The Proper Rule in Fluctuating Exchanges, 28 MICH. L. REV. 229
(1930); Evan, Rationale of Valuation of Foreign Money Obligations, 54 MICH. L.
REV. 307 (1956); Fraenkel, Foreign Moneys in Domestic Courts, 35 COLuM. L. REV.
360 (1935); Gluck, The Rate of Exchange in the Law of Damages, 22 COLUM. L. REV.
217 (1922); Negus, The Rate of Exchange in Reference to Foreign Debts and Debts
Expressed in Foreign Currency, 40 L.Q. REv. 149 (1924).
2. Jamaica Nutrition Holdings v. United Shipping, 643 F.2d 376, 379 n.5 (5th
Cir. 1981); Frontera Transportation Co. v. Abaunza, 271 F. 199 (5th Cir. 1921); 31
U.S.C. § 371 (1976). See Morris, English Judgments in Foreign Currency: A "Proce-
dural" Revolution, 41 LAW & CONTEP. PROBS. 44 (1977). The historical reason for
the rule in England was that the sheriff could not be expected to know the value of
foreign currency and thus could not enforce any judgments by execution unless ex-
pressed in pounds sterling.
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francs were equivalent to one hundred dollars, but by the
time judgment day arrives, three years later, one hundred
francs will buy only seventy-five dollars. The problem con-
fronting the court is that it must employ a conversion rate
prevailing upon a chosen date. If the court measures the dam-
ages as of the day of breach (breach day rule) Y would receive
one hundred dollars; if, however, the court measures the dam-
ages as of the day of judgment (judgment day rule), Y would
receive only seventy-five dollars.
In 1975, English courts allowed judgments to be entered
in the foreign currency.3 This procedure eliminates problems
of conversion and injustices resulting from fluctuations in the
foreign money subsequent to the date of judgment," but, as
discussed below, it is not necessarily the best solution in all
cases.
The issue of when foreign currency should be trans-
formed into money of the foreign country, whether at day of
breach or day of judgment, often comes before the courts on
the heels of a revolution or a war.' With the fall of South Vi-
etnam in 1975 and the Iranian revolution of 1979, the courts
are again confronted with a number of cases involving the
problem of exchange rates. This comment explores the prin-
cipal rules and methods that have been* advanced by courts
and legal scholars as possible solutions to the problems of con-
version. It illustrates that no easy mechanical formula will
provide a fair solution in all situations. Finally, this comment
analyzes foreign and domestic cases involving conversion
problems and suggests adoption of an "equitable. rule" as op-
posed to restrictive procedural rules which could lead to ineq-
uitable administration of the laws.
3. Miliangos v. George Frank (Textiles) Ltd., 1976 A.C. 443.
4. See Dach, supra note 1.
5. See generally id. Drake, supra note 1; Fraenkel, supra note 1.
6. See Co v. Bank of America, No. C-79-1213 (N.D. Cal. Filed May 25, 1979;
settled Aug. 24, 1981); Durrent v. Bank of America, No. C-78-1813 (N.D. Cal. Filed
Apr. 19, 1978; settled Aug. 24, 1981). Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A.,
660 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1981).
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II. BREACH DAY RULE
A. General Principles
Under the breach day rule, when a plaintiff is entitled to
recover a sum expressed in a foreign money, the measure of
damages will be converted into dollars at the rate of exchange
prevailing at the date of breach of the contract, or the date
when the debt became due. In 1923, this procedural method
of conversion, 8 was adopted by the New York Court of Ap-
peals in Hoppe v. Russo-Asiatic Bank9 and has been upheld
in many subsequent cases."0 Like New York, the English
courts also adopted and followed the breach day rule1 until it
was invalidated by the House of Lords in Miliangos v. George
Frank (Textiles) Ltd. in 1975.12
In the cases decided in New York and in England prior to
1975, the courts tried solving the problem of valuating foreign
money by relying on the theory of commodities.13 The courts
have used this concept of money to justify application of the
breach day rule.1 4 Under the commodities theory, foreign
7. See Parker v. Hoppe, 257 N.Y. 333, 178 N.E. 550 (1931); Hoppe v. Russo-
Asiatic Bank, 235 N.Y. 37, 138 N.E. 497 (1923); Librairie Hachette v. Paris Book
Center, Inc., 62 Misc. 2d 873, 309 N.Y.S.2d 701 (Sup. Ct. 1970); Taubenfeld v.
Taubenfeld, 198 Misc. 1072, 97 N.Y.S.2d 158 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
8. Drake, The Rule, the Principle, the Standard in Fluctuating Exchange, 25
MICH. L. REv. 860 (1927).
9. 235 N.Y. 37, 138 N.E. 498 (1923). Although conversion of foreign currency at
the rate of exchange prevailing at the date of breach of contract was adopted by the
courts prior to Hoppe in Gross v. Mendel, 171 A.D. 237, 157 N.Y.S. 357 (1916), affd,
225 N.Y. 633, 121 N.E. 871 (1918), the court in that case based its decision on the
doctrine of "re-exchange." For further discussion see Fraenkel, supra note 1, at 368-
69.
10. Hughes Tool Co. v. United Artists Corp., 279 A.D. 417, 110 N.Y.S.2d 383
(1952), aff'd mem., 304 N.Y. 942, 110 N.E.2d 884 (1953); Librairie Hachett v. Paris
Book Center, Inc., 62 Misc. 2d 873, 309 N.Y.S.2d 701 (Sup. Ct. 1970); see also Brill v.
Chase Manhattan Bank, 14 A.D.2d 852, 220 N.Y.S.2d 903 (1961). But see
Buxhoeveden v. Estonian Nat'l Bank, 106 N.Y.S.2d 287 (Sup. Ct. 1951), rev'd on
other grounds, 279 A.D.2d 1089, 112 N.Y.S.2d 785 (1952); Bonell v. Von Schultz, 197
Misc. 756, 95 N.Y.S.2d 617 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
11. Di Ferdinando v. Simon, Smits & Co., [1920] 3 K.B. 409, 413; Manners v.
Pearson, [1898] 1 Ch. 581, 592.
12. [1976] A.C. 443.
13. See Di Ferdinando v. Simon, Smits & Co., [1920] 3 K.B. 409; Manners v.
Pearson, [1898] 1 ch. 581. The subtle distinctions between the New York rule and the
old English breach day rule are discussed in Evan, supra note 1, at 323.
14. See Sokoloff v. National City Bank, 250 N.Y. 69, 164 N.E. 745 (1928);
Hoppe v. Russo-Asiatic Bank, 235 N.Y. 37, 138 N.E. 497 (1923); Kantor v. Aristo
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money is treated like silver, copper, coin, and wheat; it fluctu-
ates in price in relation to domestic currency. Damages for
failure to deliver foreign money pursuant to a contract would
be assessed in the same manner as would damages for breach
of contract to deliver any of the above mentioned commodi-
ties. Therefore, damages would be calculated on the day of
breach. This is meant to put a plaintiff in the same position
he would have been in had the commodity been purchased on
the specific date at the agreed upon purchase price.16
The fallacy in this theory is that foreign money is not al-
ways a commodity. If someone in New York had speculated
on the position of the English pound in the world market by
entering into a contract payable in English money, then the
commodity theory would apply; because the money, like silver
or gold, is being dealt with to make a profit."6 In other words,
the currency has its own intrinsic value. Where a contract is
made in France, however, and payment for goods are to be
made in francs, it would be incorrect to argue that the parties
viewed the francs as a commodity-to them, the francs were
merely a medium of exchange. Money in this context has no
intrinsic value; it serves only to facilitate the purchase.'
The courts and legal scholars eventually realized that the
commodity justification for the breach day rule was not mer-
ited in many cases. With the strength of the British pound
and American dollar, however, the New York and English
courts were hesitant to adopt the judgment day rule, because
under that rule the defaulting debtor benefited from depreci-
ating foreign currency. This generated a search for other ra-
tionales to support the breach day rule. As a result, a number
Hosiery Co., 222 A.D. 502, 226 N.Y.S. 582, aff'd 248 N.Y. 630, 162 N.E. 553 (1928);
Gluck, The Rate of Exchange in the Law of Damages, 22 COLUM. L. REV. 217, 235
(1922).
15. For example, B (buyer) makes a contract with S (seller) to deliver a cow to
B. If the seller fails to deliver the cow on the stipulated date, B must, if he still wants
a cow, go into market and buy one at the market price at the date of breach. B should
be allowed to recover as damages the replacement cost of that cow at the date when
the seller breached his contract. Likewise, if S fails to pay or deliver a sum of dollars
or francs at the stipulated date, B must, if he still wants that currency, go into the
market on the breach date and acquire the currency at the rate of exchange on that
date. If B does not choose to go into the market and buy currency or as in the first
hypothetical, another cow, which the seller failed to deliver, this should not alter the
measure of damages.
16. Fraenkel, supra note 1, at 364.
17. See Cohn, supra note 1.
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of justifications for the rule have been suggested as well as a
number of criticisms.
First, an advantage of the breach day rule expressed by
the courts is that in most contract cases it restores the plain-
tiff to the position he would have occupied had the contract
not been broken. 8 The fallacy of this argument is that the
plaintiff might receive a lesser or a greater amount than he
would have received had he sued in the foreign country, de-
pending on the relative value of the currencies at the time of
judgment. For example, if the franc was worth 50 cents at the
date of breach and 25 cents at the date of judgment, the
breach day rule would permit the plaintiff to recover twice the
amount he would have recovered in France. 19 Likewise, if the
franc appreciated, plaintiff would receive a lesser judgment
than he could have received in the French courts. Hence, a
disadvantage of the breach day rule is that it encourages
plaintiffs to forum shop in pursuit of the jurisdiction which
will award the greatest amount of damages.
A second justification for the breach day rule, which
closely resembles the first, is that full compensation can only
be equal to the purchasing power of the foreign currency at
the time the obligation fell due. 0 This is likewise not merited.
In fact, if the value of the foreign currency has depreciated
and/or the value of the domestic currency has appreciated,
the foreign creditor would receive more purchasing power
than payment on the original date would have brought by
bringing suit in the United States rather than in his own
country. This flies in the face of the principle of nominalism
which governs the treatment of money obligations in almost
all countries today.' Under this theory, the creditor should
receive the equivalent in domestic currency of what he would
receive in foreign currency had the suit been brought in the
foreign country. Pursuant to nominalistic principles, unless
the creditor bears the risk of depreciation of the foreign cur-
18. See Orlik v. Wiener Bank Verein, 204 A.D. 432, 198 N.Y.S. 413 (1923);
Gross v. Mendel, 171 A.D. 237, 157 N.Y.S. 357 (1916), af'd mem., 225 N.Y. 633, 121
N.E. 871 (1918).
19. In Sirie v. Godfrey, 196 A.D. 529, 188 N.Y.S. 52 (1921) the court refused to
apply the breach day rule because under the rule, the plaintiff would have received a
much greater recovery than she would have received had she sued in France.
20. See Kantor v. Aristo Hosiery Co., 222 A.D. 502, 226 N.Y.S. 582, affd mem.,
248 N.Y. 630, 162 N.E. 553 (1928).
21. See infra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
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rency, the creditor could recover more than the debtor prom-
ised to pay.
A third argument advanced in favor of the breach day
rule is that adoption of the judgment day rule tempts litigants
to delay proceedings in the hope of profiting from the fluctua-
tion in exchange rates."2 The breach day rule, however, per-
mits the same kind of speculation because a creditor, for ex-
ample, may seek to delay trial to benefit from the
appreciation of a domestic currency."
Because of the many fallacies in the arguments for the
breach day rule, it would appear that the New York and En-
glish courts' primary goal was to achieve an equitable result,
one that would protect creditors against losses caused by de-
preciating currency and prevent breaching debtors from bene-
fiting from their defaults. Hence, the procedural remedy was
adopted as a means to justify the end; but at the same time,
the courts appeased the legal community by establishing a
procedural rule on which parties could rely.2 4
During the period following World War I, the breach day
rule appeared to provide the fairest conversion rate. During
that time, when an action to recover a foreign obligation was
brought in either New York or England, the foreign currency
usually had depreciated in relation to the money of the forum
state. 5 By requiring the debtor to pay the amount owed
before depreciation, the creditor was indemnified for losses re-
sulting from depreciating currency, and the debtor was pre-
cluded from obtaining a windfall.2' The benefits of this rule,
22. A. DICEY, DIGEST OF THE LAW OF ENGLAND WITH REFERENCE TO THE CONFLICT
oF LAWS 728-31 (5th ed. 1932). See Gluck, aupra note 1, at 244; Fraenkel, supra note
1, at 366.
23. For example, if defendant owed plaintiff 120 francs when three francs
equalled one dollar, the creditor could delay the trial and judgment in the hopes that
the domestic currency would appreciate. If there was appreciation such that, four
francs equalled one dollar, the creditor would receive $40.00 under the breach day
rule. This $40.00 could then be exchanged for 160 francs. Thus, plaintiff would bene-
fit by 40 francs by successfully delaying judgment.
24. See, e.g., 8upra notes 10-11. In essence, if the equities favored application of
the breach day rule, the courts applied it.
25. See Di Ferdinando v. Simon, Smits & Co., [1920] 3 K.B. 409; S.S. Celia v.
S.S. Volturno, [1921] 2 A.C. 544.
26. Suppose an obligation arose in France for 1000 francs which at the time
equalled $1,000 on the day of breach. The French creditor sues the American debtor
in New York. On the day of judgment, the francs depreciated to the equivalent of
only $500. If the rate of exchange is valued at the date of breach, the creditor suffers
no loss as a result of the depreciation of the franc, nor would the debtor receive un-
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however, went sour when the domestic currency began to de-
preciate relative to the foreign currency. The inequitable ef-
fects of a single, rigid procedural rule will become more appar-
ent after further analysis of New York and English decisions.
B. New York Cases
Prior to the adoption of the breach day rule by the Court
of Appeals of New York in Hoppe v. Russo-Asiatic Bank,27 a
lower court adopted the judgment day rule in Sirie v. God-
frey. In Sirie, a Parisian sued an American to recover the
purchase price of wearing apparel sold in France. The defen-
dant tried to pay the plaintiff the amount due in francs nearly
six years after delivery of the goods. The defendant claimed
that the amount was insufficient because the francs had sig-
nificantly depreciated in value. The Appellate Division ruled
that since the debt was due in France, it was dischargeable in
francs and hence the plaintiff was not entitled to recover the
value of the francs at the date of breach, but rather at the day
of judgment."9
Subsequent to Sirie, New York's highest court decided
Hoppe. In that case, the defendant, a Russian banking corpo-
ration, received a check, the proceeds of which it agreed to
pay the plaintiff at the defendant's London office. Upon de-
mand, the defendant refused to make the payment.3 0 In a per
curiam opinion, the court did not even cite to Sirie and held
that:
In an action properly brought in the courts of this state
by a citizen or an alien to recover damages, liquidated or
unliquidated, for breach of contract or for a tort, where
just enrichment. If, on the other hand, the court applies the judgment day rule, the
debtor would only pay creditor $500 instead of $1,000 and thereby would benefit from
profitably speculating in the money of the foreign forum.
27. 235 N.Y. 37, 138 N.E. 497 (1923). It should be noted that some New York
courts applied the breach day rule to foreign currency conversion problems prior to
1923, but support of that rule was based on the doctrine of re-exchange. See Gross v.
Mendel, 171 A.D. 237, 157 N.Y.S. 357 (1916), afl'd, 225 N.Y. 633, 121 N.E. 871 (1918);
Fraenkel, supra note 1, at 369.
28. 196 A.D. 529, 188 N.Y.S. 52 (1921).
29. Id. at 538-39, 188 N.Y.S. at 58. The court was concerned with unjust enrich-
ment by the creditor and held that just by bringing an action in the United States the
plaintiff acquired no right to a more favorable judgment than she could have ob-
tained had the action been brought in France.
30. 235 N.Y. at 37-38. 138 N.E. at 497.
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primarily the plaintiff is entitled to recover a sum ex-
pressed in foreign money, in determining the amount of
the judgment expressed in our currency the rate of ex-
change prevailing at the date of breach of contract or at
the date of the commission of the tort is under ordinary
circumstances to be applied."
Just two years after Sirie was decided, and one year after
Hoppe, the lower appellate court distinguished Sirie in Orlik
v. Weiner Bank of Verein.2 The plaintiff, an American citi-
zen, brought suit to recover from an Austrian bank a deposit
of 60,000 kronen he had demanded be paid in 1919. Citing
Hoppe, the court held that the plaintiff was entitled to the
value of kronen as of the date demand was made. The court
did not apply the judgment' day rule as in Sirie because in
that case the plaintiff was a resident of a foreign state. Again,
the reason for the court's distinction and its adoption of the
breach day rule appears to be based on principles of fair-
ness-on July 16, 1919, 60,000 kronen were equivalent to
$2,190, but by the time of trial the value of 60,000 kronen had
depreciated to $420.00." Had the court applied the judgment
day rule, the defendant would have received a windfall of
$1,770 at the plaintiff's expense.
The New York courts' interest in fairness led to subse-
quent decisions applying both the breach day rule and the
judgment day rule. The courts' decisions depended on such
distinctions as whether the contract was to be performed en-
tirely within a foreign county,8" or whether the controversy
was a suit for payment of an overdue loan rather than an ac-
tion for damages.88 Finally, in Kantor v. Aristo Hosiery Co.,3
the New York Court of Appeals abolished these distinctions
holding "that in the interest of uniformity the breach-day rule
should be followed in the absence of clear proof of exceptional
conditions. 3 7 New York courts have since applied the breach
day rule to all possible transactions."
31. Id. at 39, 138 N.E. at 498.
32. 204 A.D. 432, 198 N.Y.S. 413 (1923).
33. Id. at 433, 198 N.Y.S. at 414.
34. See Metcalf Co. v. Mayer, 213 A.D. 607, 211 N.Y.S. 53 (1925).
35. See Matter of King, 129 Misc. 244, 221 N.Y.S. 730 (Sup. Ct. 1927).
36. 222 A.D. 502, 226 N.Y.S. 582 (1928), afl'd, 248 N.Y. 630, 162 N.E. 553
(1928).
37. Id. at 503, 226 N.Y.S. at 584.




Although the courts in a number of cases prior to World
War I adopted the breach day rule, 9 England's modern ap-
proach to this rule was expressed in Di Ferdinando v. Simon,
Smits & Co.40 In that case, an Italian merchant contracted
with the defendant in England to ship merchandise to Italy.
The defendants breached this agreement and the plaintiff
brought suit in England to recover damages. At the time of
breach, damages equalled 48,000 lire or 1555 pounds, but sub-
sequently, the lire depreciated by one-half of that value. The
Court of Appeal held that the damages for breach of contract
must be converted into pounds sterling at the rate of ex-
change prevailing on the day of breach. Had the court opted
for the judgment day rule, defendant would have benefited by
only having to pay plaintiff 780 pounds instead of the breach
day debt of 1555 pounds. 41
A year later, the House of Lords upheld the breach day
rule in S.S. Celia v. S.S. Volturno." This action arose out of a
collision between an English ship and an Italian ship whereby
the losses to the Italian ship, which resulted mainly from the
negligence of the English crew, totaled 304,418 lire. Before
final judgment, the lire depreciated relative to the English
pound. The House of Lords held that the proper date for as-
certaining the rate of exchange for the purposes of converting
lire into English currency was the date when the damage
occurred. 3
These two cases thus settled the English law as to the
conversion date for damages in breach of contract and tort. In
these and several other leading English cases in which the
breach day rule was adopted,44 a similar fact pattern appeared
in each case: (1) the debt was created in a foreign jurisdiction;
(2) the breach occurred in a foreign jurisdiction; (3) suit was
383 (1952), af'd mem., 304 N.Y. 942, 110 N.E.2d 884 (1953); Librairie Hachette v.
Paris Book Center, Inc., 62 Misc. 873, 309 N.Y.S.2d 701 (Sup. Ct. 1970); De Sayve v.
de la Valdene, 124 N.Y.S.2d 143 (Sup. Ct. 1953).
39. See, e.g., Scott v. Bevan, [1831] 2 B & Ad. 78. But see Manners v. Pearson
& Son, [1898] 1 Ch. 581 (supporting the judgment day rule).
40. [1920] 3 K.B. 409. See also Barry v. Van Den Hurk, [1920] 2 K.B. 709;
Lebeaupin v. Crispin, [1920] 2 K.B. 714.
41. See [1920] 3 K.B. 409, 411.
42. [1921] 2 A.C. 544.
43. Id. at 547.
44. See supra note 22.
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brought in an English court; and most significantly, (4) in
each case there was a depreciation of the foreign currency be-
tween the time the obligation became due and the date of
judgment.' In other words, the English courts' primary con-
cern was that the defendant not benefit from his dereliction of
duty. The courts adopted the breach day rule as a means of
addressing this concern.
English law was settled in the area of unliquidated dam-
ages,4 but controversy remained over which conversion date
to apply regarding liquidated debts.'7 In 1961, the House of
Lords in In re United Railways of the Havana and Regla
Warehouses, settled the controversy by asserting that claims
for a liquidated debt will be treated the same as claims for an
unliquidated debt.'8
D. Application of the Breach Day Rule
After analysis of cases applying the breach day rule, it is
clear that the different courts used the rule to achieve what
they believed to be a more just result under the circum-
stances. At the time, the United States and Great Britain
were two countries with relatively strong currency, and the
breach day rule provided legal justification for protecting the
interests of creditors from the effects of depreciating foreign
currency.' 9 Now, it appears that the courts may have
straightjacketed themselves into arbitrary uniformity. As a re-
sult, when sterling depreciated in terms of foreign currency,
unlike in the earlier cases, the breach day rule no longer pro-
tected the creditor.
The English courts' concern for justice, however, led to
45. Drake, supra note 1, at 235.
46. Unliquidated damages are not stipulated by the parties at the time of enter-
ing the contract, and are ascertained by the court. In contrast, liquidated damages are
a stipulated calculable sum agreed upon by the parties at the time of entering into
the contract.
47. Compare Societe des Hotels Le Touquet Paris-Plage v. Cummings, [1922] 1
K.B. 451 (adopted judgment day rule asserting the principle of nominalism), with
Vionnet v. Wills, [1940] 1 K.B. 72 (adopted breach day rule).
48. [1961] A.C. 1007. See Morris, supra note 2, at 45-47.
49. See Dach, supra note 1, at 181. The fact that there are numerous conversion
rules "itself suggests that none of these rules have the force of some natural law." Id.
Further, the author concludes that changes of conversion dates within particular
countries is not based on logic or legal principles but rather is a product of the courts'
desire to protect creditors against loss caused by depreciating foreign currency.
[Vol. 22
FOREIGN CURRENCY
the Miliangos decision in 1975 and the abolition of the breach
day rule in England.50 Furthermore, in a fairly recent case
before the New York Supreme Court, Librairie Hachette, S.A.
v. Paris Book Center, Inc.," the court did not consider appli-
cation of the breach day rule necessarily superior to the judg-
ment day rule in contract disputes. By the time plaintiff in
Librairie brought suit in New York, the foreign currency debt
had depreciated. The court held that "[ifn this case, the equi-
ties favor application of the 'breach day rule.' If it were not
applied, the defendant would be rewarded for defaulting in
his obligation to pay for the merchandise."" Although, the
court agreed with plaintiff that the weight of authority in New
York was that the breach day rule should apply, it noted that
"[t]here should be no rigid rule of thumb.""
The decisive consideration for the New York court ap-
pears to have been that the defendant would have received a
windfall for his default if the judgment day rule were applied.
The rule selected was a secondary consequence of the court's
primary concern for equity. It could be assumed that if the
foreign currency had appreciated instead of depreciated, thejudgment day rule would have governed.
The early English and New York cases thus demonstrate
the need for the courts to adopt particular guidelines to pro-
mote equitable results. The Miliangos and Librairie decisions
suggest that the courts are willing to move away fom mechani-
cal procedural rules in favor of an "equitable rule."
III. FEDERAL RULE-DuAL APPROACH
A. Breach Day and Judgment Rules
The Federal courts, unlike the New York or pre-1975 En-
glish courts, use both the breach day and the judgment day
rule, depending on place of payment.55 When a debt is paya-
50. See infra notes 88-97 and accompanying text.
51. 62 Misc. 2d 873, 309 N.Y.S.2d 701 (Sup. Ct. 1970).
52. Id. at 877, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 705. See Becker, The Currency of Judgment, 25
AM. J. Compu. L. 152 (1977).
53. 62 Misc. at 877, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 705.
54. Several countries after World War I went from a breach day to a judgment
day rule while others went in a reverse direction. See Dach, supra note 1.
55. See A. NUSSBAUM, MONEY IN no LAw, NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL, 367
(rev. ed. 1950). The author mentions that "it is not clear whether the place of pay-
1982]
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ble in foreign currency in a foreign country, or the contract is
to pay foreign money in a foreign country, the proper date of
conversion is the judgment date, and not the date on which
the obligation arose.56 Conversely, when payment is to be
made in the United States or the cause of action arises in the
United States, the courts will apply the breach day rule. 7
The question of conversion was first addressed by the
United States Supreme Court in Hicks v. Guinness6 e In that
case, a German firm was indebted to an American firm in the
amount of 1,079.35 marks, payable in the United States. The
debt was incurred before World War I, but the value depreci-
ated drastically after the war. Justice Holmes, who spoke for
the Court, held that because the plaintiff's claim for dollars
arose at the time the debt was incurred, the damages should
be converted at the exchange rate prevailing at the date of
breach.59 Just a year later, however, a slim majority in Die
Deutsche Bank Filiale Nurenburg v. Humphreys' held that
where a debt is owed in a foreign country by a foreign debtor,
it should be converted into dollars at the exchange rate pre-
vailing on the judgment date."' Justice Holmes, again speak-
ing for the Court, held that: "[a]n obligation in terms of the
ment or the applicable law is the criterion of the distinction." Id. at n.31.
56. See Zimmermann v. Sutherland, 274 U.S. 253 (1927); Die Deutsche Bank
Filiale Nurenburg v. Humphrey, 272 U.S. 517 (1926); Paris v. Central Chiclera, S. de
R.L., 193 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1952); The West Arrow, 80 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1936); Till-
man v. Russo-Asiatic Bank, 51 F.2d 1023 (2d Cir. 1931); Thornton v. National City
Bank, 45 F.2d 127 (2d Cir. 1930); Laminoirs-Trefileries-Cableries de Leus, S.A. v.
Southwire Co., 484 F. Supp. 1063 (N.D. Ga. 1980); B.V. Bureau Wijsmuller v. United
States, 487 F. Supp. 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Sun Ins. Office v. Arauca Fund, 84 F. Supp.
516 (S.D. Fla. 1948); Royal Ins. Co. v. Compania Transatlantica Espanola, 57 F.2d
288 (E.D.N.Y. 1932).
57. See Sutherland v. Mayer, 271 U.S. 272 (1926); Hicks v. Guinness, 269 U.S.
71 (1925); Wichita Mill & Elevator Co. v. Naamlooze Industrie, 3 F.2d 931 (5th Cir.
1925).
58. 269 U.S. 71 (1925).
59. Id. at 80. This result seems equitable; the American creditor should not suf-
fer a loss due to depreciation of foreign currency while he can demand payment in
U.S. dollars. See Note, Conversion Date of Foreign Money Obligations, 65 COLUM. L.
REv. 490, 495 (1965).
60. 272 U.S. 517 (1926).
61. Id. at 519-20. See also Societe des Hotels le Touquet Paris-Plage v. Cum-
mings, [1922] 1 K.B. 451. The confusion in the area of exchange rates of foreign obli-
gations is evidenced by the fact that although Die Deutsche Bank is cited by subse-
quent cases for establishing the judgment day rule, Justice Holmes claimed that the
rate of exchange should be at the date of commencement of the action rather than
the judgment date. See Fraenkel, supra note 1, at 383 n.83; Morris, supra note 2, at
47.
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currency of a country takes the risk of currency fluctuations
and whether creditor or debtor profits by the change, the law
takes no account of it."'6 2
Justice Sutherland, in a strong dissent, observed that the
judgment day rule put an undue emphasis upon the character
of the thing delivered and ignored the essential element of the
time when delivery was to be made. 8
Hicks and Die Deutsche Bank led to application of the
conflict of laws approach when choosing a date of conversion
for foreign money obligations. 4 For example, the First Re-
statement of Conflict of Laws provides for a rule of conver-
sion that is based upon where the cause of action was cre-
ated.6 Under this approach, the judgment day rate would
apply when foreign law governs the transaction and the
breach day rate would apply when the law of the American
forum governs.66
62. 272 U.S. at 519. See also Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U.S. 107 (1890) (holding
that no plaintiff should benefit from forum shopping).
63. 272 U.S. at 522 (Sutherland, J., dissenting). Justice Sutherland stated that,
in an action brought here to recover upon a failure to deliver marks in
Germany, the question of time becomes material; for here a mark is not
money, but a commodity; and if plaintiff is to be compensated in dollars
for his loss, we must inquire, When [sic] did the loss occur? just as we
must make that inquiry in order to fix in dollars the value of wheat in a
suit to recover for the non-delivery of that commodity.
Id. (emphasis in original).
64. See Note, Fluctuating Rates of Exchange and the Conflict of Laws, 40
HARv. L. REv. 619 (1927).
65. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 423, 424 (1934). Section 423 provides:
"Damages for breach of a contract to deliver money not currency of the state where
the delivery is to be made are meapured in currency of the state of performance at
the rate of exchange current at the time of breach." Section 424 provides: "Where
judgment is rendered on a cause of action for damages created in another state, the
rate of exchange adopted is that which exists at the time when the judgment is
rendered."
The present Restatement does not explicitly discuss the breach day and judg-
ment day rules, but provides:
When in a suit for the recovery of money damages the cause of action is
governed by the local law of another state, the forum will convert the
currency in which recovery would have been granted in the other state
into local currency as of the date of the award.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 144 (1971).
66. See Laminoirs-Trefileries-Cableries de Leus, S.A. v. Southmire Co., 484 F.
Supp. 1063, 1070 (N.D. Ga. 1980). The federal courts have been hesitant to shift away
from the mechanistic judgment day and breach day rules since Die Deutsche Bank.
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B. Nominalism
The primary justification for the judgment day rule re-
sides in the concept of nominalism. Under our law, an obliga-
tion for payment of a sum expressed in domestic money re-
mains unaffected by inflation or depreciation of the dollar."
Thus if X is indebted to Y for $1,000.00 as of March 1, he is
not obligated to pay back $1,050.00 in principal if, due to in-
flation, the value of the dollar has fallen 5% subsequent to
March 1. Similarly, a successful plaintiff cannot recover for
foreign currency depreciation.in a contract dispute. To allow
recovery for foreign currency depreciation would have the
same effect as allowing a plaintiff to increase his damage
award to compensate for inflation.
This nominalistic concept is assumed to prevail in all
countries. If an obligation is expressed in the money of the
foreign place of payment and is subject to its laws, the federal
courts will treat this as "money" rather than as a commodity,
thereby ignoring fluctuations in value or in purchasing
power." This concept was clearly announced by Justice
Holmes in Die Deutsche Bank:
Obviously, in fact a dollar or a mark may have different
value at different times but to the law that establishes it
it is always the same. If the debt had been due here and
the value of dollars had dropped before suit was brought
the plaintiff could recover no more dollars on that ac-
count. A foreign debtor should be no worse off."9
Under nominalism, conversion of foreign money to do-
mestic currency at the judgment date would yield an
equivalent amount of dollars for the creditor as would a suit
brought in a foreign country.70 Although the debtor may be
67. Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935); Nortz v. United States, 294 U.S.
317 (1935); Norman v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 294 U.S. 240 (1935); Die Deutsche Bank
Filiale Nurenberg v. Humphrey, 272 U.S. 517 (1926); Juillard v. Greenman, 110 U.S.
421 (1884). See also Richard v. American Union Bank, 253 N.Y. 166, 170 N.E. 532
(1930); Hughes Tool Co. v. United Artists, 279 A.D. 417, 110 N.Y.S.2d 383 (1952).
68. Zimmermann v. Sutherland, 274 U.S. 253 (1926); Die Deutsche Bank Filiale
Nurenberg v. Humphrey, 272 U.S. at 517. See also Paris v. Central Chiclera, S. de L.
R., 193 F.2d 960, 962-63 (5th Cir. 1952); Shaw, Davill, Albion & Co. v. The Freder-
icksburg, 189 F.2d 952, 955 (2d Cir. 1951).
69. 272 U.S. at 519.
70. For example, X contracts to deliver French merchandise to Y in America for
1000 French francs. Y refuses to pay at a time when one franc equals one dollar.
Subsequently, the franc depreciates. On the day of judgment the franc is worth only
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required to pay less in United States dollars when the foreign
currency has depreciated in relation to the dollar than he
would have had there been no depreciation, the courts have
never looked to the debtor side of a transaction to assess
plaintiff's damages. Contract and tort law in the United
States have always allowed the injured party to recover only
that amount which would put him in the same position he
would have enjoyed had there been no injury. Just as one can
argue that the debtor should not receive a windfall due to
world currency fluctuations, likewise, a creditor should not
benefit from such variations. This is precisely what happens
when the breach day rule is applied and the foreign currency
depreciates subsequent to the breach.7'
Although many commentators have insisted that the
judgment day rule is consistent with the principle of nominal-
ism, this is not entirely correct. Currency fluctuations between
the date of judgment and the date of payment can result in a
greater or lesser recovery than if the suit had been brought in
a foreign country.72 Thus, conversion on day of payment,
rather than day of judgment, "gets nearest to securing to the
creditor exactly what he bargained for."'78
C. Analysis of the Judgment Day Rule
Although the greatest aspect of the judgment day rule is
that it achieves uniform results no matter where the plaintiff
brings suit, this mechanical formula will not provide a fair so-
lution in all situations. For example, where parties to a con-
fifty cents. Pursuant to the nominalist theory, even though it seems inequitable, the
defendant only has to pay plaintiff $500 instead of $1,000. When plaintiff converts
the money into francs he will recover the full 1000 francs for which he originally
bargained. Plaintiff is put in as good a position as that in which he would have been
put by full performance of the contract. Furthermore, he receives the same judgment
he would have received had the suit been brought in France. An in depth discussion
on the application of nominalism is provided in Cohn, supra note 1, and in Hauser,
Breach of Contracts Damages During Inflation, 33 TUL. L. REv. 307 (1959).
71. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
72. For example, if P sues D in the United States for 100 francs owing on a debt
due in France and on judgment day the rate of exchange for five francs is $1.00, D
must pay P $20.00. P may then exchange the $20.00 for 100 francs. The injustice of
the judgment day rule is evidenced when on the day of payment the dollar depreci-
ates and $20.00 will buy only 75 francs. Hence, P recovers less than D promised to
pay. Morris, supra note 2, and Dach, supra note 1, at 386 n.95, both support the
"payment day" rule.
73. Miliangos v. George Frank (Textiles) Ltd., [1976] A.C. 443, 469.
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tract exchange foreign currency as a commodity for trade, like
copper or wheat, the judgment day rule is unsatisfactory be-
cause the currency is not being used to puchase a product, but
rather is itself the product being purchased.74 If the value of
the foreign currency depreciates in relation to the domestic
currency and the judgment day is chosen as the day of conver-
sion, the purchaser receives less of the product than he agreed
to purchase. The only way plaintiff could be properly compen-
sated is by awarding him the value of the commodity, in this
case foreign currency on the day the contract was breached.
Another criticism of the judgment day rule was expressed
in Justice Sutherland's dissent in Die Deutsche Bank where
he stated that: "To take the date of judgment for determining
the value is to adopt for the measurement of a loss a test rest-
ing upon the fluctuating chances of a court calendar instead of
upon an event already fixed, that is,-to put aside certainty
for uncertainty. '75 Although this contention is not without
merit, possible fluctuations and uncertainty in the value of a
judgment are nonetheless present in suits not involving con-
version of foreign currency. This is so because the United
States follows the nominalistic principle of money and refuses
to consider changes in the value of money when determining
the rights and obligations of the litigants.
Criticism of the judgment day rule has also been ex-
pressed when domestic currency appreciates in relation to the
foreign currency stipulated in a contract. Some courts will ap-
ply the breach day rule rather than the judgment day rule in
such cases; otherwise, the defendant would benefit from his
default." Conversely, the creditor should not be put in a bet-
ter position than he would have enjoyed had the contract
been fulfilled." This, however, is the result when the breach
day conversion rule is applied where domestic currency has
depreciated and/or foreign currency has appreciated. There-
fore, under strict contract theory, the judgment day rule is
theoretically preferable because, although defendant receives
a windfall, plaintiff should be put in neither a better nor
worse position than that for which he has bargained. Conse-
74. See Note, supra note 59, at 492; Gluck, supra note 1.
75. 272 U.S. at 523 (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
76. Librarie Hachette, S.A. v. Paris Book Center, Inc., 62 Misc. 873, 877, 309
N.Y.S.2d 701, 705. See generally Becker, supra note 47.
77. S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1338 (rev. ed. 1977).
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quently, when the value of the foreign currency depreciates,
the courts should disregard such depreciation because under
the nominalistic theory courts are not to consider change in
the value of money when determining the amount of damages.
It appears from the discussion above that neither the
judgment day rule nor the breach day rule will provide a fair
solution in every case. Although the federal courts have
adopted both rules based on place of payment, that factor
alone is insufficient to guarantee a fair result."8 The federal
courts should try to resolve each case so that the injured party
receives damages that are closely related to the wrong he or
she has suffered. Only in this way can the court avoid
straightjacket solutions based on inflexible procedural rules.
In the recent case of B.V. Bureau Wijsmulter v. United
States, 9 the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York applied principles of equity and public
policy in protecting a professional salvage company from suf-
fering because of a decline in the value of the dollar in rela-
tion to the Dutch guilder between the day of breach and the
date of judgment. The court awarded the plaintiff $175,000
for his reasonable services and rendered an "uplift" factor to
protect him "against the consequences of currency fluctuation
which tends to diminish [his] reward." 80
Although the court applied general maritime law, claim-
ing that the rate of exchange problem cannot be determined
by reference to principles derived from other areas of law, the
fact remains that equitable solutions are available to the
courts if they can look beyond established, inflexible
precedent.
IV. Miliangos-PAYMENT DAY OR PAYMENT IN FOREIGN
CURRENCY
When the breach day rule was first established in Great
Britain, the pound sterling was strong, and only foreign cur-
rency depreciated. The rule was acceptable, because to decide
otherwise, would have rewarded the debtor for defaulting on
his obligation to pay the creditor. Of course, when the pound
sterling depreciated in relation to foreign currencies, the in-
78. See infra notes 115-37 and accompanying text.
79. 487 F. Supp. 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
80. Id. at 179.
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justices of the breach day rule became apparent to the
courts 1 The English Court of Appeal in 197582 and the House
of Lords in 197683 reconsidered the rule for judgment and con-
version rates.84
In Schorsch Meier G.m.b.H. v. Hennina8 goods were sup-
plied by a German auto parts dealer to an English buyer
under a contract calling for payment in German currency.
When the debt became due in February 1972, the sterling
equivalent was 452 pounds, but when the German seller is-
sued his writ in July 1975, the sterling equivalent had depreci-
ated to 641 pounds. For two reasons, the Court of Appeal dis-
regarded 350 years of precedent and held that plaintiff was
entitled to the amount of judgment either in Deutschmarks or
in the sterling equivalent at the date of payment.
First, the court relied on Article 106 of the Treaty estab-
lishing the European Economic Community (EEC)86 which re-
quired the English court, as the national court of a member
state, to give the creditor residing in another member state
judgment in his own currency under the contract.
Second, the court held that the breach day rule and the
rule that judgment had to be in pounds sterling were no
longer valid because the reasons for the rule had been eroded
by changes in the form of money judgments."
An opportunity to take the next logical step came before
81. F. MANN, LEGAL AsPEcT OF MONEY 358 n.2 (3d ed. 1971). See Mann, The
Rate of Exchange: An Urgent Appeal for a Minor Reform of the Law, 15 MOD. L.
REV. 369, 369-71 (1952) [hereinafter cited as Mann, Rate of Exchange]. If the breach
day rule had been applied when the value of the pound depreciated relative to foreign
currency, the creditor would have received less than he would have received by suing
in the country of the foreign currency.
82. Schorsch Meier, G.m.b.H. v. Hennin [1975] Q.B. 416.
83. Miliangos v. George Frank (Textiles) Ltd., [1976] A.C. 443.
84. The rule adopted by the House of Lords in Miliangos, was advocated as far
back as 1952 by F.A. Mann: "where the claim is for a sum of foreign currency, the
judgment . . . should be for that sum or its sterling equivalent at the date of pay-
ment." Mann, Rate of Exchange, supra note 81, at 371.
85. (1975] Q.B. 416.
86. Treaty of Rome, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 (both England and Ger-
many are members).
87. As Lord Denning aptly stated:
Why have we in England insisted on a judgment in sterling and nothing
else? It is, I think, because of our faith in sterling. It was a stable cur-
rency which had no equal. Things are different now. Sterling floats in
the wind. It changes like weathercock with every gust that blows. So do
other currencies. This change compels us to think again about our rules.
[1975] Q.B. at 424.
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the House of Lords in the Miliangos case."s In May 1971, the
plaintiff, a Swiss native, delivered a quantity of polyester yarn
to English defendants for payment in a certain amount of
Swiss francs, the sterling equivalent of which was 42,000
pounds. The purchaser failed to pay on the due date, and the
plaintiff brought suit. Due to the depreciation of the sterling
pound, as of the date of trial in 1974, the sterling equivalent
increased to 60,000 pounds. In this case, unlike in Hennin, the
Treaty of Rome was not available because Switzerland was
outside the EEC. The House of Lords nevertheless gave the
defendant an option: he either could pay the plaintiff the pre-
cise amount of foreign currency stated in the judgment, or he
could, on the date of payment (not the breach date or the
judgment date), pay an equivalent amount in domestic cur-
rency. If the defendant were to appeal the judgment, the date
of conversion would be postponed and new equivalents would
take effect." This decision had the effect of putting the credi-
tor in the same position he would have been in had the con-
tract been performed, or had suit been filed in Switzerland. If
the court instead had applied the breach day rule, the creditor
would have recovered less than the debtor promised to pay,
and less than the creditor would have been awarded had he
sued in Switzerland.
The House of Lords based its conclusion on several fac-
tors. First, Lord Wilberforce, speaking for the court, rejected
the commodity theory of foreign money as erroneous.90 Sec-
ond, the court noted that because of floating currencies it was
no longer the exception that change in the relative value of
the currencies occurred between the date of breach and the
date of judgment (or payment). 1 This compelled the court to
find a rule that would do justice to creditors when the domes-
tic currency depreciated relative to the foreign currency.
Third, the court felt that problems of conversion would be
avoided by making orders calling for payment in foreign cur-
rencies.92 Finally, the court felt that it was wrong in principle
88. [1976] A.C. 443.
89. Id. at 497-98.
90. Id. at 461. See generally supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text.
91. [1976] A.C. at 463.
92. Id. at 464. In The Halcyon the Great, [1975] 1 W.L.R. 515, the court, sitting
in admiralty, held that the Admiralty marshal was empowered to sell a ship for
United States dollars. The case stands for the proposition that "U.S. dollar currency
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to allow procedure to detrimentally affect the creditor's sub-
stantive rights.9' The court indicated that the creditor who
bargained only in his currency should not benefit or suffer
from procedural rules. Furthermore, the court agreed with
Justice Holmes' concept of nominalism discussed in Die
Deutsche Bank;" the creditor should take the domestic cur-
rency (in this case the pound sterling) as he finds it.
The court limited the application of Miliangos to claims
for debts expressed in foreign currency where the law of the
contract is that of the foreign country." The Miliangos rule,
however, was extended by the Court of Appeal to claims in-
volving damages for tort" and breach of contract.97
Miliangos ended 350 years of English precedent which
had run the full gamut of legal analysis. The breach day rule
was adopted primarily on equitable grounds, but it no longer
provided an equitable remedy, because the world economy
had changed. The problem with the Miliangos rule, like any
other procedural rule, is that the courts again may be con-
fronted with radical world monetary fluctuations and unique
factual circumstances. If the rule became inappropriate under
changed circumstances, stare decisis might inhibit any neces-
sary change. The courts should not bind themselves to partic-
ular formulas for foreign currency conversion, because the in-
terests of equity require different formulas for different
circumstances.
V. AN EQUITABLE RULE
It has been suggested by at least one scholar and implied
by others that Miliangos provides the best rule when it comes
may be regarded as 'money' within the meaning of English procedural rules and that
the courts can easily adapt their procedure so as to give effect to foreign money
claims . . . ." [19761 A.C. at 443. See generally B.V. Bureau Wijsmuller v. United
States, 487 F. Supp. 156, 179 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (noting that the admiralty court tradi-
tionally sits in equity).
93. [1976] A.C. at 465.
94. Die Deutsche Bank Filiale Nurenberg v. Humphrey, 272 U.S. 517, 519
(1926).
95. [1976] A.C. at 467-68, 497-98, 503.
96. Owners of M.V. Eleftherotira v. Owners of M.V. Despina R., [1978] 3
W.L.R. 804.
97. Services Europe Atlantique Sud (SEAS) of Paris v. Stockholms Rederiak-
tiebolag SVEA of Stockholm, [1978] 3 W.L.R. 804. See Note, Judgments in Foreign
Currencies: Extension of the Miliangos Rule, 42 MOD. L. REv. 452 (1979).
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to judgments involving foreign contracts, torts, and other obli-
gations and therefore the United States should adopt this rule
instead of continuing with the judgment day rule."8 It is ar-
gued that conversion of the foreign obligation at the date of
payment "gets nearest to securing to the creditor exactly what
he bargained for,"" whereas conversion on the date of judg-
ment allows for currency fluctuations between that date and
the date for payment.
Although the payment day rule will usually achieve a just
result, this will not always be the case. Rather, the different
rules for date of conversion should be considered together in
each case as procedural guidelines which can help the court
reach the most equitable result. Below are reasons why the
American courts should apply such an "equitable rule" and
thereby institute a standard based on flexibility instead of
adopting inflexible rules. 100
A. Payment with Intent to Convert
The first weakness with the mechanical rules described
above can be illustrated by the following example. If an Amer-
ican creditor contracts for payment in a foreign currency, he
will presumably convert the money into dollars upon receipt.
The creditor might, however, intend to retain the foreign cur-
rency. In this situation, instead of relying on only one rule,
the court should be able to apply either the judgment day rule
or the breach day rule depending on whether the creditor
would have retained the foreign currency or converted into
dollars upon payment.10'
98. See Morris, supra note 2, at 53; Dach, supra note 1, at 386 n.95; Mann,
supra note 76.
99. [1976] A.C. at 469.
100. Direct support for this approach to foreign currency conversion has been
limited. Although, some support is found in Note, supra note 59, at 490. The author
refers to an "empirical approach" to foreign currency conversion. See RESTATEMENT
SECOND OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 144 Reporter's note (1971) (there may be support for
an "ad hoc" approach).
101. As a further illustration, suppose an American citizen contracts to deliver
heavy machinery to an Austrian corporation for the sum of 60,000 schillings. At the
time of delivery, the defendant refuses to pay for the amount in question ($2,000).
Pursuant to the contract, defendant brings suit in the Federal court against the Aus-
trian corporation for the contract price of 60,000 schillings, which the court must
convert into dollars. However, subsequent to the day of breach, the schilling depreci-
ates in relation to the dollar so that 60,000 schillings now buys only $1,000. If the
court were to apply the judgment day rule, defendant would pay plaintiff $1,000
1982]
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The judgment day rule, rather than the breach day rule,
should be applied in cases where plaintiffs would have re-
tained the foreign currency received under the contract.'""
Not only is this consistent with nominalism, but it is also con-
sistent with the basic precepts of recovery in Anglo-American
judicial systems because it places the plaintiff in the position
he would have been in had the contract been fulfilled. If the
court were to apply the breach day rule it would result in
awarding inadequate compensation or a windfall to the plain-
tiff depending on whether the foreign currency appreciates or
depreciates subsequent to the day of the breach. Suppose,
however, two parties had engaged in similar transactions
which had always resulted in immediate conversion of francs
to dollars. In this case the reasonable expectation of the par-
ties would not be given effect if the court used the judgment
day rule. If the francs depreciated, the American plaintiff
would receive a lesser equivalent in dollars to satisfy the for-
eign currency debt. This is not what the parties expected;
rather, the currency was to be paid in francs'03 which, in the
usual course of dealing, would have been exchanged immedi-
ately for dollars.10' In this situation, the court should apply
the breach day rule and award plaintiff the value of the bar-
gained for dollars.'06 The court should not recognize the re-
whereby plaintiff would subsequently convert the $1,000 into 60,000 schillings. Al-
though defendant appears to benefit from this transaction, plaintiff is put in the same
position he would have been in had the contract been fulfilled. If, on the other hand,
the plaintiff had intended at the time he entered into the contract to convert the
schillings into dollars upon payment, the judgment day rule would be unjust. In the
end, the plaintiff would receive only $1,000 instead of the $2,000 he would have ac-
quired had he been able to receive and exchange the 60,000 schillings on the day it
was owed.
102. See Note, supra note 59, at 497.
103. Foreign money might be used for a number of reasons, e.g., it could be
easier to work with for both parties during the exchange.
104. Similarly, if the Miliangos rule were employed, the plaintiff would not re-
ceive the benefit of his bargain. Although the plaintiff is paid in francs, the Miliangos
rule does not account for the plaintiff's intent to immediately exchange the francs for
dollars upon payment. As a result, if the franc depreciates subsequent to the breach
date, the amount of francs paid to plaintiff will be insufficient to acquire the dollars
he would have acquired had he been paid the francs when due.
105. See Note, supra note 59, at 495-96. The inequities of the "federal rule,"
under which the place of payment determines the use of the breach day rule or judg-
ment day rule, are evident when, regardless of place of payment, plaintiff would have
converted the foreign currency into dollars. For example, where two Americans make
separate agreements for payment, one in London and the other in New York, and
both Americans intended to convert to dollars upon receipt of payment, plaintiff who
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strictive nature of procedural rules and simply apply the judg-
ment day rule in order to conform to the result of a foreign
court. It appears, therefore, that before the court can hand
down an equitable remedy, it must first inquire whether the
plaintiff would have retained the foreign currency he was to
be paid or would have converted it to dollars had defendant
paid at the specified time. l08
The manner of conversion for tort claims should be no
different than for contract claims, because both causes of ac-
tion employ the same rationale for awarding recovery: The
plaintiff should be put in the position he would have enjoyed
had the injury not taken place.1"7 If an injured American were
forced to convert his dollars to foreign currency in order to
pay expenses incurred as the result of an injury, the court
should then award him an amount in dollars according to a
conversion date that would most accurately reflect the ex-
penses he would need to pay in the foreign currency. In this
way, the court could place the plaintiff closer to the relative
position he occupied before the injury by protecting him from
currency fluctuations.
B. Devaluation and War-Case on Point
Periods of war illustrate the need for retreating from in-
flexible procedural rules and adopting an "equitable rule."108
During times of war and foreign trade restrictions, the courts
have managed to bend either the breach day rule or the judg-
ment day rule to arrive at equitable rates of exchange. 10'9 In
was to be paid in New York is protected against any possible devaluation of foreign
money under the breach day rule, whereas plaintiff who was to be paid in London,
although receiving sufficient foreign currency, will not receive the benefit of his bar-
gain if the foreign currency depreciates. The restatement has abolished the "place of
payment" distinction and applies the judgment day rule when the cause of action is
governed by the law of a foreign state. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS §
144 (1971).
106. See Drake, The Rule, the Principle, the Standard in Fluctuating Ex-
change, 25 MICH. L. REv. 860 (1927). The major difficulty with this inquiry of course,
is establishing the prior intention of the plaintiff, but prior course of dealings and
customary commercial practice may help the court establish this intention. Note,
supra note 59, at 498-99, provides further discussion regarding proof of the prior in-
tentions of the plaintiff to convert or retain foreign currency obligations.
107. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 627-31 (4th ed. 1975).
108. See generally Cohn, supra note 1, at 522-28.
109. See Sutherland v. Mayer, 271 U.S. 272 (1926); Aratani v. Kennedy, 317
F.2d 161 (D.C. Cir. 1963); International Silk Guild v. Rogers, 262 F.2d 219 (D.C. Cir.
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Sutherland v. Mayer110 for example, a suit was brought by the
Alien Property Custodian to obtain assets involved in an ac-
counting between an American and his German partners. The
assets were located in Germany when World War I caused a
dissolution of the partnership. Settlement with the American
partner was legally impossible until the close of the war be-
cause business transactions were forbidden. After World War
I the German mark depreciated substantially. The court, how-
ever, refused to apply the breach day rule"' in a partnership
situation where the obligor-partner would innocently suffer
the entire loss. It was an "ineluctable consequence of the
war" 1 ' and no one was to blame. The court, held that the
conversion date should be placed at the first opportunity
which the debtors had to satisfy their obligations. In other
words, the value at which the foreign currency was to be
translated into dollars was calculated at the exchange rate
when commercial intercourse and communication between cit-
izens of the United States and Germany was restored after
World War I.'"
The difficulty with Sutherland is that it has been limited
to situations in which the breach day rule would ordinarily
have applied. " Why can't the rationale of Sutherland be ex-
tended to cases where the judgment day rule would apply or,
as in England, where the Miliangos rule would be appropri-
ate? The inequity of inflexible adherence to either rule was
acknowledged by Lord Simon of Glaisdale in his dissenting
opinion in Miliangos."5 Lord Simon posed the hypothetical of
an Englishman who agrees to buy an art collection from
Count Comneus of Central Europe for 10 million Ruritanian
1958). All three cases have two characteristics in common: (1) The foreign currency
obligation was payable in the United States, and (2) it was impossible to settle the
obligation when it arose.
110. 271 U.S. 272 (1926).
111. Hicks v. Guinness, 269 U.S. 71 (1925), also involved a foreign currency ob-
ligation subject to American law and payable in the United States. Procedurally then,
the court should have used the breach day rule.
112. 271 U.S. at 292.
113. The same rule was applied in Aratani v. Kennedy, 317 F.2d 161 (D.C. Cir.
1963), and International Silk Guild v. Rogers, 262 F.2d 219 (D.C. Cir. 1958), which
involved obligations arising out of World War II.
114. See Cohn, supra note 1, at 527; International Silk Guild v. Rogers, 262
F.2d 219, 225 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
115. [1976] A.C. at 470.
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talers which are equivalent to one million pounds. " 6 The col-
lection is shipped to England but the purchaser fails to pay on
the due date because war breaks out and strict exchange con-
trols are imposed. As a result of the war and subsequent
revolution, the Ruritanian taler becomes worthless. The
count, penniless, manages to escape to England and file suit to
recover one million pounds for his art collection. Under the
Miliangos rule, defendant would have to pay 10 million
Ruritanian talers or the equivalent in pounds sterling at the
day of payment. Because the Ruritanian taler has become
worthless, however, the Count receives nothing under either
method. The inequity of applying these rules based on "nomi-
nalistic theory" is self-evident-the Englishman acquires val-
uable property without having to pay for it while the creditor
is left penniless. If this same situation were to occur in
America, the court would employ the judgment day rule. The
Count would be no better off because, as stated earlier, the
equitable principles expounded by the court in Sutherland
are inapplicable where the judgment day rule applies.1 17
Two cases from the same set of circumstances, which are
analogous to Lord Simon's hypothetical in Miliangos, were re-
cently settled in the United States District Court. " Though
settled, Co v. Bank of America" 9 provides a useful example of
the problems created by inflexible conversion rules and the
benefits of an equitable approach. In Co, the plaintiff, a na-
tional of the Republic of Vietnam, filed a complaint to recover
damages, inter alia, for money deposited in the Saigon branch
of the defendant, Bank of America. In February 1975, Mr. Co
deposited 300,050,000 piasters worth 428,642 dollars. On April
24, 1975, the Saigon branch was closed by Bank of America
due to increased fighting in that area between South Vietnam
and North Vietnam. Mr. Co was not notified and was, there-
fore, prevented from obtaining money due. On April 30, 1975,
Saigon fell to North Vietnam. Subsequent to the day of
116. Id. at 488-89.
117. See Cohn, supra note 1, at 527; International Silk Guild v. Rogers, 262
F.2d 219, 225 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
118. Co v. Bank of America, No. C-79-1213 (N.D. Cal. Filed May 25, 1979; set-
tled Aug. 24, 1981); Durrent v. Bank of America, No. C-78-1813 (N.D. Cal. Filed Apr.
19, 1978; settled Aug. 24, 1981). Both cases have now been settled out of court.
119. No. C-79-1213 (N.D. Cal. Filed May, 25, 1979; settled Aug. 24, 1981).
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breach, the piaster became worthless. 120 Upon his arrival in
the United States, plaintiff demanded and was denied the
breach day dollar equivalent of his deposited piasters. 2'
Because Bank of America's obligation to Mr. Co arose
under, and was governed by the laws of South Vietnam, the
federal rule would have forced the court to use the conversion
rate applicable on the day of judgment. Under these circum-
stances plaintiff would recover nothing.'22 The same result
would occur if the court were to apply the Miliangos rule of
paying either the piasters due or their dollar equivalent on
date of payment. 2 '
On the other hand, because the federal court was sitting
in diversity, it was required by Erie Railroad v. Tompkins "
to apply the foreign currency conversion rules employed by
the courts of California, which have applied the breach day
rule in the past.12 5 Pursuant to the breach day rule, the bank
would pay Mr. Co roughly one-half million dollars.
120. In September of 1975 the new provincial revolutionary government issued
regulations for the exchange and conversion of the old regime's piasters into a new
currency called the Southern dong. This subsequently was converted into the
Vietnamese dong. The time periods for the conversions were limited to only several
days. Plaintiff's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment at 3-4, Co v. Bank of America, No. C-79-1213 SW
(Filed Feb. 25, 1981). In 1979 one dollar was equivalent to 2.17 dongs. CENTRAL IN-
TELLIGENCE AGENCY, HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC STATISTICS (1980). Further information
regarding exchange rates of the dong is contained in International Financial Statis-
tics, Supplement on Exchange Rates, BUREAU OF STATISTICS OF THE INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY FUND, No. 1, 1981.
121. See Plaintiff's Complaint for Recovery of Bank Deposit Breach of Con-
tract, Fraud, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, Breach of Warranty and
Negligence at 4-5, Co v. Bank of America, No. C-79-1213 SW (Filed May 25, 1979).
The alleged day of breach was April 24, 1975 when Bank of America closed its Saigon
branch, preventing plaintiff from withdrawing his deposit. Id. at 6.
122. See Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment at 1, Co v. Bank of America, No. C-79-1213 SW
(Filed Dec. 19, 1980).
123. For the sake of argument, it is assumed that the bank will be held liable
under these hypothetical situations. An in depth look at the liability of U.S. parent
banks for their foreign branches is provided in Heininger, Liability of U.S. Banks for
Deposits Placed in Their Foreign Branches, 11 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUs. 903 (1979);
Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 660 F.2d 854, 862-64 (2d Cir. 1981).
124. 304 U.S. 04 (1938). The Erie doctrine raises the problem of the inequities
resulting from the presence or lack of diversity jurisdiction and the consequent bene-
fit or detriment that it could mean to a plaintiff in this situation. See generally,
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965); Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Corp., 356
U.S. 525 (1958); Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
125. Compania Engraw Com. E. Indus. v. Schenley Distillers Corp., 181 F.2d
876, 879 (9th Cir. 1950).
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Whatever rule a court deems appropriate to utilize, it
seems unjust that one party must bear the entire burden of
currency fluctuations where blame for the situation rests upon
neither party. The court in this situation should adopt a con-
version plan supported by principles of equity and public pol-
icy. 126 Although adopting a conversion date other than the
judgment date would be inconsistent with the principle of
nominalism and thus, encourage forum shopping,12 7 the
court's objective should be to award just compensation to
plaintiffs for their damages.
Analogous issues were raised in the case of Banco Na-
cional De Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank.12 8 The Cuban na-
tional bank brought actions against numerous American
banks to recover amounts owing. One of the banks, Chase
Manhattan, conceded liability to Banco Nacional in the
amount of $9,794,020, but counterclaimed to set-off the
amount owing by a sum equal to the value of its Cuban assets
confiscated following the 1959 revolution of Cuba.
The court concluded that Chase was entitled to a set-off
of $6,094,870 for the taking of its Cuban branches. The court
then addressed plaintiff's contention that any judgment
granted on Chase's counterclaims should be converted to Cu-
ban pesos on the day of judgment. The plaintiff was seeking
to eliminate the set-off's effect since Cuban pesos were with-
out value in the United States.
The court concluded that Chase Manhattan and the other
American banks were entitled to damages based on the con-
version rate prevailing on the day of confiscation. The court
did not apply the traditional judgment day rule, holding that
"to require a conversion on a date not related to reality would
create an obvious injustice under the circumstances of this
case."1 9 Noting that the purpose of the judgment day rule is
126. See Sutherland v. Mayer, 271 U.S. 272 (1976). Even if the Sutherland rule
is applicable where the judgment day rule is ordinarily applied, plaintiff would still
receive nothing in this case because the piaster was worthless when commercial inter-
course resumed.
127. If the judgment day rule is not adopted, the amount recovered will not
equal that amount which would have been recovered in the foreign jurisdiction on the
same date. Therefore, plaintiff will seek the jurisdiction which will provide the great-
est amount of damages.
128. 505 F. Supp. 412 (S.D. N.Y. 1980), aff'd and modified on other grounds,
658 F.2d 875 (2d Cir. 1981).
129. Id. at 464. The court, at the outset of its opinion, claimed that it had diver-
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to prevent forum shopping, the court concluded that such a
danger was not present in the case.130
The circumstances of Mr. Co's case was similar. There
was no danger of forum shopping, because the Bank of
America would never subject itself to personal jurisdiction in
the communist regime of Vietnam.131 Furthermore, applica-
tion of the judgment or payment day rules would produce re-
sults similar to those labelled an obvious injustice in Chase
Manhattan Bank. 32
If Mr. Co would not have been able to receive value for
his piaster even without the breach or if the court would be
forced to speculate about the deals he could have made on the
black market,' 8 then it would make sense to have him bear
the risk of the currency depreciating.'"" In fact, there had
been a legitimate market for converting piasters to a valuable
currency. Five months after the fall of South Vietnam, the
new regime established a currency program whereby piasters
could be exchanged for "southern dongs."'' 35 Under the 1975
exchange rate, one southern dong was worth 500 piasters. In
time, the southern dong was to be converted into northern
dongs and eventually the piaster became worthless.'13 Had
Mr. Co obtained his piasters, he would have at least been able
to exchange a portion of them for the communist regime's new
currency.
The problem presented by this case is one of determining
a proper currency-conversion date. It is obvious that neither
the breach day nor the judgment day rules will provide an eq-
uitable conversion rate. Choosing the applicable date of con-
sity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (a)(2). Under Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64 (1938), a federal court sitting in diversity must apply the conversion rule
employed by the forum state. Because New York has traditionally followed the
breach day rule rather than the judgment day rule, it is unclear why the district court
felt compelled to discuss the judgment day rule. See Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhat-
tan Bank, 660 F.2d 854, 865-67 (2d Cir. 1981).
130. 660 F.2d at 865-67.
131. See generally Jamaica Nutritional Holdings v. United States Shipping Co.,
643 F.2d 376, 381 (5th Cir. 1981).
132. 505 F. Supp. at 464.
133. Courts are generally precluded from investigating the possible uses of the
currency had there been no breach. See Note, supra note 59, at 499.
134. Interview with Mark H. Pierce, attorney for plaintiff, Co, in San Jose, Cali-
fornia (Dec. 2, 1980).
135. G. NGUYEN TIEN HUNG, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIALIST VIETNAM
165-66 (1977).
136. See supra note 112.
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version is a complex and difficult task. The court must, never-
theless, balance the interests of the parties, without losing
sight of the policies underlying the rules on conversion, which
are to put the plaintiff in the same position he would have
enjoyed had the wrong not occurred and not to indemnify him
against losses from appreciating domestic currency and/or de-
preciating foreign currency. '
C. Guidelines
Concepts of equity and flexibility seem desirable and just,
but if courts are not directed by appropriate guidelines, arbi-
trary and inconsistent decisions will result. Several procedural
rules should be adopted to promote certainty and uniformity
of judgments, which will in turn encourage defendants' offers
to settle. Some recommended guidelines include the following:
1) Where parties to a contract intend to treat foreign
currency as a commodity (i.e., the object of the sale), the
courts should apply the breach day rule. 3 8
2) The judgment day rule should be changed to the pay-
ment day rule as expressed in Miliangos.3 9
3) Where a plaintiff contracts for payment in a foreign
currency, if the plaintiff would have retained the foreign cur-
rency paid, the court should apply the payment day rule. If
plaintiff, in the usual course of dealing, would have converted
the foreign currency into domestic currency immediately upon
payment, the court should apply the breach day rule. 40
4) The rules of conversion applied in contract cases
should be applied similarly in tort cases.14 1
5) When it appears that employment of either the tradi-
tional breach day rule or payment day rule will create an in-
justice under the circumstances of the case, the courts must
137. One approach might be to compute how many dongs plaintiff could have
exchanged for his piasters had he been able to withdraw them. Then on day of judg-
ment look to the rate of exchange for dongs. In this way, plaintiff is not indemnified
for currency fluctuations.
138. See Note, supra note 59, at 492; Gluck, supra note 1. See also supra notes
13-16 and accompanying text.
139. Conversion of foreign money to domestic currency on day of payment pro-
tects both parties from monetary fluctuations occurring subsequent to the judgment
date, but prior to the payment date. See Schorsch Meier G.m.b.H. v. Hennin, [1975]
Q.B. 416.
140. See supra notes 101-06 and accompanying text.
141. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
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be free to devise a measure of recovery that best approximates
justice.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the past, different dates of conversion have been fa-
vored at different times, under different circumstances, and
for different reasons. So long as the value of currencies contin-
ues to fluctuate relative to each other, the courts must con-
tinue to grapple with the problem of converting foreign money
judgments into domestic currency. Compelled by a desire to
do justice, the courts have designed procedural formulas in
their search for a perfect solution. Unfortunately, these inflex-
ible rules have been far from perfect in all cases. In sum, the
courts should take an equitable approach to foreign currency
conversions; with the help of flexible guidelines, they should
look at the circumstances of each case, balance the interests of
the parties involved, and thereby determine a fair conversion
rate.
Paul L. Lion III
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